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 Abstract 
 
Food assistance is one of the most common forms of safety net programs in post-
conflict situations. Besides the humanitarian and promotional roles, there are 
widespread scepticisms of food assistance regarding its possible influence on 
disincentive to work and on crowding out of private transfers. While there is a 
relatively large amount of empirical research on social protection in stable context, it 
is less researched in post-conflict situations. Based on randomized evaluation of a 
food-for-training program implemented in Southern Sudan, this paper estimates 
these effects. We observe a significant negative impact (about 13%) on per capita 
household income. However, there is no effect on the hours of work or the type of 
the economic activities of the adult members. The decline in income mostly 
happened through a reduction in child labor. There is also a positive effect on school 
enrolment for girls (about 10 percentage points) and an improvement in their 
housing status. We also do not find any indication of crowding out of private 
transfers for the participants. This is most likely due to the extent of private transfers 
being very low to begin with. However, there is a small but significant impact of the 
transfers given out by the participants.  
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production  through  price  effects  (Tadesse  and  Shively,  2009),  crowding  out  of  informal  assistances 
(Dercon and Krishnan, 2003), effects on productivity through improved nutritional status, effects on 
asset accumulation to break poverty traps (Gilligan and Hoddinott, 2007), appropriate forms of transfers 
(cash  vs.  in  kind)  (Basu,  1996)  or  efficacy  of  conditionality.  However,  most  of  the  empirical  works, 
especially with micro data, are limited to relatively stable contexts. Moreover, the findings are not 
unequivocal. For example, Lentz (2003) in her careful review of the 25 years of literature did not find any 
incidence  of  a  clear  evidence  of  (dis)incentive  effects  of  food  assistance.  In  this  paper,  we  use 






































Unlike  disincentive  effects,  theoretical  prediction  of  transfer  programs  on  crowding  out  of  private 
transfers is less univocal. If private transfers are motivated by altruism, public transfers are likely to 






dramatic  example  is  presented  in  Cox  and  Jimenez  (1995).  According  to  their  estimates  in  urban 
Philippines, a transfer of 100 pesos from public program can reduce informal support by 92 pesos, 
resulting in only 8 pesos of net gain from 100 pesos of support. Jensen (2003) finds that public transfer 
for  the  elderly  people  in  South  Africa  was  counterbalanced  by  20‐40%  decline  in  private  transfer. 































































































head)  were mobilized into  small groups.  In  group  meetings,  alternative  training  opportunities  were 
described and each participant chose one income generating activity (IGA) to receive training. Though 





















Once  the  households  list  of  a  village  was  prepared,  the  staffs  visited  each  household  to  collect 















A  randomized  evaluation  of  this  program  was  designed.  Once  the  eligible  households  were  finally 
selected by BRAC‐SS, 500 households were selected randomly for the intervention and the rest 549 




that  many  of  the  households  were  recent  returnees  from  IDP  camps.  Comparison  of  the  attrited 

















































































































conflict  and  displacement  usually  reduce  informal  risk‐sharing  to  smooth  consumption  (Maria  and 




































included  in  the  survey  though  there  was  a  marginally  positive  impact  on  ceremonial  expenses 
(marriage/funeral). However, this impact does not come from an increase in expenses for the treatment 
households but from a lower rate of reduction over the year compared to the control households. The 
positive  coefficient  for  impact  on  education  expenses  is  imprecisely  estimated  and  not  significant. 
Estimated effect on total expenses on annual non‐food items was SDG 117.  
 













































In  Column  4,  results  from  instrumental  variable  regression  are  presented.  In  this  estimate,  the 
dependent variables in the second stage are the changes in the variables from baseline to follow‐up.  
 















out  by  the  participants  is  made  to  the  control  households,  estimated  impact  on  consumption/ 
expenditure is likely to be biased downwards.  
 
In  order to get  a  sense of  the extent  of  spillover effects,  heterogeneity  in  changes  for  the  control 











































































































































































































Atlabara Munuki Hai‐gabat Jabel Kujur  Buluk  Katun
Treatment   0.733 0.820  0.683 0.810 0.271 0.829  0.918
(1=yes, 0=No)  (0.022)***  (0.046)*** (0.056)*** (0.043)*** (0.085)***  (0.047)***  (0.031)***
Control mean  0.141 0.071  0.187 0.086 0.358 0.108  0.068
(0.016)***  (0.028)** (0.040)*** (0.031)*** (0.059)***  (0.036)***  (0.027)**
Observations  943  158  173 187 129 138  158







Received food transfers (1=yes)  0.807 (0.021)*** 0.106  (0.015)***  814
Household size  0.066 (0.169) 5.377  (0.123)***  813
Number of children (<15 years old)  0.009 (0.118) 1.853  (0.084)***  813
Number of working aged (15‐65 years) male ‐0.044 (0.097) 1.509  (0.070)***  813
Number of working aged (15‐65 years) female 0.106 (0.080) 1.955  (0.055)***  813
Number of old (>65 years) members ‐ 0.006 (0.017) 0.059  (0.012)***  813
Number of household members with disability ‐0.033 (0.031) 0.171  (0.022)***  813
Maximum years of schooling in the household ‐0.148 (0.118) 2.807  (0.085)***  784
Male headed households (1=Yes, 0=No) ‐ 0.005 (0.013) 0.036  (0.009)***  813
Respondents can read and write (1=Yes, 0=No) ‐0.025 (0.029) 0.227  (0.020)***  813
Respondent is married (1=Yes, 0=No)  0.046 (0.029) 0.197  (0.019)***  813
Age of the respondent (in years)  0.693 (0.821) 45.03  (0.572)***  812
Respondents’ religion (1=Catholic, 0=other) ‐0.018 (0.035) 0.581  (0.024)***  813
Respondents’ tribe (1=Bari, 0=Other)  0.010 (0.033) 0.315  (0.023)***  813
Respondent  was  born  in  the  same  district  where 
currently living (1=Yes, 0=No) ‐ 0.036  (0.031)  0.279  (0.022)***  814 
Number of relatives (households) in the village ‐0.996 (0.607) 6.950  (0.454)***  814
Owns homestead land (1=Yes, 0=No) ‐ 0.033 (0.033) 0.693  (0.022)***  814
Owns house (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.000 (0.035) 0.443  (0.024)***  808
Own cattle (1=yes, 0‐No) ‐ 0.035 (0.028) 0.222  (0.020)***  814






(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Treatment  25.10  14.27 14.32 0.14 0.12  0.13
(1=Yes, 0=Control)  (50.20)  (47.51) (47.56) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.09)
Follow‐up ‐ 70.36 ‐ 67.57 ‐53.17 ‐0.185 ‐0.18 ‐ 0.15
(1=2009, 0=2008)  (51.79)  (49.84) (49.70) (0.10)* (0.10)*  (0.10)
Treatment X follow‐up 
‐118.57 ‐ 120.63 ‐130.69 ‐0.264 ‐0.27 ‐ 0.29
(67.88)*  (65.57)* (64.64)** (0.14)* (0.14)**  (0.13)**
Constant  582.59  635.93 609.82 5.669 5.83  5.73
(36.34)***  (115.18)*** (117.38)*** (0.07)*** (0.24)***  (0.24)***
Baseline characteristics ‐ Yes Yes ‐ Yes  Yes
Branch dummies ‐ ‐   Yes ‐‐   Yes
Observations  1,434  1,428 1,428 1,434 1,428  1,428





Hour Income Hour Income Hour  Income
Treatment ‐ 31.17  180.82 ‐120.14 ‐253.19 107.40  196.48
(1=Yes, 0=Control)  (85.82)  (109.62)* (107.14) (154.71) (37.43)***  (57.66)***
Follow‐up  79.48 ‐ 34.46 ‐348.65 ‐452.51 ‐35.64 ‐ 54.16
(1=2009, 0=2008)  (88.44)  (104.79) (98.02)*** (150.69)*** (20.70)*  (26.44)**
Treatment  X 
follow‐up 
72.63 ‐ 184.12 32.03 164.38 ‐97.51 ‐ 143.20
(127.22)  (151.34) (139.14) (217.53) (41.39)**  (64.89)**
Constant  1,229.76  591.47 ‐228.42 ‐480.71 32.20  109.88
(246.14)***  (255.55)** (249.28) (373.26) (80.89)  (126.14)
Observations  1,618  1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618  1,618

















Treatment  4.02 ‐14.48 ‐13.05 ‐7.66 0.15 
(1=Yes, 0=Control)  (41.38)  (14.78) (83.42) (26.38) (0.15) 
Follow‐up ‐ 87.16  14.65 110.62 41.37 ‐0.48 
(1=2009, 0=2008)  (38.65)**  (17.54) (85.81) (30.49) (0.13)***
Treatment  X 
follow‐up 
2.56 33.92 45.39 ‐9.24 ‐0.16 
(53.03)  (28.34) (123.73) (40.70) (0.19) 
Constant  190.13  44.66 824.90 170.07 1.46 
(109.96)*  (38.24) (236.42)*** (89.71)*  (0.37)***
Observations  1,618  1,618 1,618 1,618 949 








































Treatment  0.01  10.00 ‐ 0.01 ‐9.74 ‐0.01  0.00
(1=Yes, 0=Control)  (0.02)  (8.04)  (0.01) (4.51)** (0.01)  (0.00)
Follow‐up  0.04  14.40  0.02 ‐6.05 0.00  0.02
(1=2009, 0=2008)  (0.02)**  (6.96)** (0.01) (5.02) (0.01)  (0.01)***
Treatment X follow‐
up 
0.04  9.07  0.06 14.87 0.02  0.04
(0.03)  (12.18) (0.02)** (6.22)** (0.02)  (0.01)***
Constant  0.09  16.47  0.01 5.12 ‐0.00  0.01
(0.06)  (21.86) (0.04) (7.66) (0.03)  (0.02)
Observations  1,603  1,618  1,613 1,618 1,618  1,618





















Treatment  3.33  11.62 18.12 ‐0.02 0.10 
(1=Yes, 0=Control)  (0.93)***  (7.05)* (29.19) (0.02) (0.03)*** 
Follow‐up ‐ 0.91  14.34 ‐46.29 ‐0.03 ‐0.05 
(1=2009, 0=2008)  (0.78)  (5.37)*** (29.19) (0.01)** (0.03) 
Treatment X follow‐up ‐ 0.82  7.59 116.83 0.07 ‐0.14 
(1.67)  (11.56) (61.53)* (0.02)***  (0.05)*** 
Constant  11.92  17.98 228.09 ‐0.01 0.46 
(2.67)***  (23.08) (103.99)** (0.04) (0.08)*** 
Observations  1,613  1,618 1,613 1,618 1,618 

















Treatment ‐ 0.02  0.02 0.07 ‐0.12 ‐0.02 ‐ 0.02 
(1=Yes, 0=Control)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.02)*** (0.08) (0.02)  (0.01) 
Follow‐up  0.07 ‐ 0.10 ‐0.05 0.54 0.09 ‐ 0.01 
(1=2009, 0=2008)  (0.03)**  (0.03)*** (0.03)** (0.08)*** (0.02)***  (0.01) 
Treatment X follow‐up  0.08 ‐ 0.09 ‐0.03 0.18 0.04  0.03 
(0.04)**  (0.05)* (0.03) (0.11) (0.03)  (0.02)*
Constant  0.59  0.55 0.95 1.03 0.06  0.05 
(0.08)***  (0.09)*** (0.06)*** (0.19)*** (0.06)  (0.04) 
Observations  1,618  1,601 1,590 1,520 1,604  1,586 
















Treatment ‐ 0.00 ‐ 0.03 ‐ 0.02 ‐0.01 ‐0.02 0.02 ‐ 0.04 
(1=Yes, 0=Control)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.01)* (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)  (0.03)
Follow‐up ‐ 0.06  0.01 ‐ 0.01 ‐0.05 ‐0.02 0.11 ‐ 0.06 
(1=2009, 0=2008)  (0.03)**  (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)*** (0.01) (0.03)***  (0.03)**
Treatment  X  follow‐
up 
0.01 ‐ 0.02  0.03 0.01 0.03 ‐0.04  0.08 
(0.04)  (0.04) (0.02)* (0.02) (0.02)* (0.04)  (0.04)*
Constant  0.16 ‐ 0.04  0.02 0.06 0.06 0.63  0.08 
(0.07)**  (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)** (0.03)* (0.07)***  (0.07)
Observations  1,618  1,618  1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618  1,618 

















Log (per capita income)  ‐0.29  (0.13)** ‐ 0.23  (0.13)* ‐ 0.32  (0.16)**  ‐0.40  (0.18)** 
Hours worked by respondent  72.63  (127.22) ‐ 1.86  (127.22)  27.82  (139.92)  71.29  (151.69) 
Hours worked by other adult members  32.03  (139.14)  89.49  (139.05)  13.14  (149.76)  40.65  (162.67) 
Hours worked by children  ‐97.51  (41.39)** ‐ 86.22 (40.92)** ‐ 63.73  (40.84)  ‐111.87  (51.43)** 
Per capita 3‐day food expenditure  ‐0.82  (1.67)  0.32  (1.64) ‐ 0.20  (2.06)  ‐0.69  (2.07) 
Per capita non‐food expenditure (last month)  7.59  (11.56) ‐ 5.35  (11.36) ‐ 1.59  (12.72)  11.30  (14.16) 
Per capita non‐food expenditure (last year)  116.83  (61.53)*  144.97 (60.76)**  179.56  (75.49)**  146.01  (73.22)** 
Transfers received (1=yes)  0.04  (0.03)  0.05  (0.03)  0.06  (0.04)  0.05  (0.04) 
Amount of transfers received (in SDG) 9.07  (12.18)  8.33  (12.07)  11.77  (14.75)  6.83  (14.83) 
Transfers given out (1=yes)  0.06  (0.02)**  0.04  (0.02)**  0.06  (0.02)***  0.07  (0.03)*** 










25 meter  50 meter 100 meter 25 meter 50 meter  100 meter
Follow‐up ‐ 0.15 ‐ 0.21 ‐0.19 0.069 0.065  0.041
(1=2009, 0=2008)  (0.13)  (0.14) (0.15) (0.028)** (0.030)**  (0.033)
Treatment density   ‐0.07 ‐ 0.03 0.00 0.005 ‐0.000 ‐ 0.003
(0.06)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.015) (0.008)  (0.004)
Follow‐up  *  Treatment 
density 
0.12  0.07 0.02 ‐0.007 ‐0.001  0.004
(0.11)  (0.05) (0.02) (0.020) (0.010)  (0.005)
Constant  6.23  6.23 6.16 ‐0.053 ‐0.049 ‐ 0.035
(0.40)***  (0.40)*** (0.41)*** (0.081) (0.083)  (0.085)
Observations  557  557 557 649 649  649





































Baseline characteristics  Attrited  Mean for panel   n 
Treatment status in RCT (1=Treated, 0=Control) ‐0.07 (0.07) 0.48 (0.02)***  994
Household size ‐ 0.43 (0.31) 5.31 (0.08)***  990
Number of children (<15 years old) ‐ 0.09 (0.27) 1.87 (0.06)***  990
Number of working aged (15‐65 years) male ‐0.17 (0.18) 1.44 (0.04)***  990
Number of working aged (15‐65 years) female ‐0.19 (0.15) 1.95 (0.04)***  990
Number of old (>65 years) members  0.02 (0.05) 0.06 (0.01)***  990
Number of household members with disability 0.00 (0.05) 0.14 (0.01)***  990
Maximum years of schooling in the household 0.20 (0.24) 2.64 (0.06)***  939
Male headed households (1=Yes, 0=No)  0.01 (0.03) 0.03 (0.01)***  989
Respondents can read and write (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.09 (0.07) 0.20 (0.01)***  989
Respondent is married (1=Yes, 0=No) ‐ 0.05 (0.06) 0.24 (0.01)***  989
Age of the respondent (in years) ‐ 0.45 (2.00) 45.12 (0.39)***  988
Respondents’ religion (1=Catholic, 0=other) 0.02 (0.07) 0.60 (0.02)***  989
Respondents’ tribe (1=Bari, 0=Other) ‐ 0.11 (0.06)* 0.34 (0.02)***  989
Respondent was born in the same district (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.05 (0.07) 0.24 (0.01)***  994
Number of relatives (households) in the village ‐1.29 (0.97) 6.17 (0.28)***  994
Owns homestead land (1=Yes, 0=No)  0.12 (0.06)** 0.69 (0.02)***  994
Owns house (1=Yes, 0=No) ‐0.03 (0.07) 0.45 (0.02)***  980
Own cattle (1=yes, 0‐No) ‐ 0.07 (0.05) 0.19 (0.01)***  994





Baseline characteristics  Actual Treatment  Control mean  n 
Household size ‐ 0.20 (0.28) 5.29 (0.12)***  488
Number of children (<15 years old)  0.01 (0.22) 1.86 (0.09)***  488
Number of working aged (15‐65 years) male ‐0.00 (0.17) 1.46 (0.07)***  488
Number of working aged (15‐65 years) female ‐0.17 (0.13) 1.91 (0.05)***  488
Number of old (>65 years) members ‐ 0.04 (0.02) 0.07 (0.01)***  488
Number of household members with disability ‐0.01 (0.06) 0.15 (0.02)***  488
Maximum years of schooling in the household ‐0.16 (0.23) 2.70 (0.09)***  462
Male headed households (1=Yes, 0=No) ‐ 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.01)***  488
Respondents can read and write (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.01 (0.05) 0.21 (0.02)***  488
Respondent is married (1=Yes, 0=No)  0.08 (0.06) 0.21 (0.02)***  488
Age of the respondent (in years) ‐ 2.76 (1.44)* 45.11  (0.59)***  487
Respondents’ religion (1=Catholic, 0=other) ‐0.06 (0.06) 0.61 (0.02)***  488
Respondents’ tribe (1=Bari, 0=Other)  0.02 (0.06) 0.34 (0.02)***  488
Respondent  was  born  in  the  same  district  where 
currently living (1=Yes, 0=No) ‐ 0.04  (0.05)  0.26  (0.02)***  490 
Number of relatives (households) in the village ‐2.34 (0.77)*** 6.80 (0.46)***  490
Owns homestead land (1=Yes, 0=No)  0.13 (0.05)** 0.68 (0.02)***  490
Owns house (1=Yes, 0=No) ‐0.09 (0.06) 0.47 (0.02)***  483
Own cattle (1=yes, 0‐No) ‐ 0.03 (0.05) 0.21 (0.02)***  490
Any member was seriously ill last year (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.03 (0.06) 0.63 (0.02)***  488
Note: Sample includes households assigned as control in RCT.  
Robust standard error in parentheses;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 